Andrew Hunt Commentary

I think that it was Henry Kissinger that once said that "academic politics is so vicious because the stakes are so low". However, when academic politics affects economic policymaking, the stakes are far from low.

Although recent headline-grabbing events within the banking system have moved the topic of a potential credit crunch centre-stage in the markets’ consciousness, the fact is that a credit crunch within the Global Financial System began a year ago, while that in the US domestic economy began late last year. More recently, Europe looks to have moved down the same path. Admittedly, the global situation did improve during December and early January, when global financial conditions eased for a variety of primarily technical reasons, but this has proved to have been only a false dawn.

Our Gravity Index for China has made only a very modest recovery so far this year.

There is a growing view that the Pandemic, and the policy response to the Pandemic, have ended the period of Secular Stagnation within the Global Economy and potentially replaced it with “fiscally-led faster growth” and higher inflation. It is easy to see the logic behind this view; the author was an ardent inflationista only 18 months ago. The only flaw in the argument would appear to be the behaviour of the bond markets, which this year look superficially at least to have been embracing the concept of renewed economic stagnation.

The subject of inflation has of course dominated markets in 2022 and most investors – no doubt cheered by some recent improvements in the reported rate of US headline inflation – are hoping that the issue will fade over the course of 2023 and leave them a “clearer run”.

No single catch-phrase epitomises the 2023 global macro outlook, but here are ten predictions for the year ahead.

Rather surprisingly, a UK tabloid newspaper recently contacted the author following the seemingly spectacular “blow up” in the UK bond markets, and the subsequent “crises” within the pension / insurance sectors. The journalist clearly wanted to write a story about reckless spendthrift government fiscal policies, and miss-management by pension fund managers. However, this was not the story that they got from the interview.

We have little (in fact, virtually no) doubt that the opening salvos of the monetary response to the Pandemic were driven by a sense of panic rather than by calculated analysis. The Federal Reserve appeared to be downplaying internally as well as externally the impact of the Pandemic as late as on the 11th March 2020, but by lunch time on the 12th March it was in full crisis mode.

Almost forty years ago, China’s then paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, decided that his country needed a “Great Leap Forward” in order to catch up with its economic rivals and secure its then fading place within the global system.

We have been saying for some time that inflationary pressures within the global goods markets may have peaked (at least for now) and that the global economy is slowing rapidly on the back of what are now very weak real incomes, collapsing monetary growth, and China’s sharp economic downturn (the causes of which run far beyond the country’s zero-COVID strategy).

As it often is when Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party wins an election by an impressive amount, the initial equity market reaction was positive. But the ramifications of the ruling party’s upper house election victory will in the intermediate term be a function of what happens to the global economy and geopolitics in the months and quarters ahead.

Last month’s ever austere Bundesbank Monthly Report contained an essay on Pension Reform in Germany. The article is quite long but suggests that the German Pension system only has two long term options to maintain its solvency: either accept that the purchasing power of pensioners is set to fall; or the retirement age will need to rise to 69 or higher by the year 2070. Either pensioners will have to accept less in the future in real terms or work longer – the choice seems stark.

“Stagflation-lite” coupled with a severe geopolitical crisis was much worse for equities than we expected, but most of the bad news is priced in, so the prospect for global economies and equities in aggregate should improve. While we expect global GDP to moderately underperform consensus, it should skirt recession and positively surprise equity markets, which increasingly have priced in recessionary conditions.

Since the Pandemic first unfolded, it has generally paid to invest and act according to what the Federal Reserve Chairman said was going to happen, rather than what did in fact happen. The obvious example being last year, when the Fed told markets not to worry about inflation even though the central bank clearly should have been worried about rising inflation rates…..

The rise that has occurred within longer term bond yields over recent weeks has certainly been “enthusiastic”, and we suspect that many view the move as being no more than a belated / overdue reaction to the higher rates of inflation within the global system.

The GIC expects the global economy to continue struggling in a form of “stagflation-lite” and sees a relatively flat performance for global equities for the next three to six months (although quite positive on Pacific equities), with moderate weakness for global bonds.

The economic costs of the current conflict in Ukraine may pale into insignificance in comparison to the human suffering, but they are not irrelevant to markets. The bottom line is of course that wars make society poorer, as does conflict in general, natural disasters, or catastrophic errors.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there has been considerable media coverage and interest about the implications this has on New Zealand investments. This invasion has seen devasting humanitarian effects. Our thoughts are with the people of Ukraine and those who have had family and friends affected by this crisis.

The Western World today faces a public sector burden that bears a troubling resemblance to the immediate Post-war period in the late 1940s and 1950s; a private sector debt burden that bears comparison to the late 1990s / early 2000s; and an inflation problem that is beginning to look like the 1970s. Now, we would add to this list a “Cold War” situation that looks like the early 1980s (i.e. Afghanistan and other Proxy Wars between superpowers).

The Federal Reserve may have been caught by surprise by the persistence of inflation in the USA over recent months but we suspect that many investors in the Emerging Markets are about to experience a similarly unpleasant surprise of their own.

While last month witnessed only its usual quota of central bank policy meetings, we suspect that it will ultimately go down in history as representing the beginning of what we suspect may become the Great Divergence within central banking. Having spent a generation moving in similar directions in an overt effort to suppress currency volatility, it now appears that the central banks within the major Economic Blocs are beginning to move in different directions. We believe that this development has the potential to dramatically alter the investment universe.

According to our Global Investment Committee, which concentrates on the intermediate term-view regarding developed markets for pension funds and other long-term investors, 2022 looks to be a challenging, but positive year for risk assets. We believe that the G-3 central banks will become more hawkish, and such pivots can often cause potholes and at the very least headwinds, but we trust that policymakers can traverse their new course successfully overall.

The global economy should match the consensus for strong growth, thanks to vaccinations, continued fiscal stimulus, acceptable global geopolitical conditions, and continued low interest rates despite increasingly hawkish central banks. Such, via increased corporate profits, should allow equity markets to perform very well ahead, with impressive returns in each region, particularly in Japan.

Although the late 1980s’ “Lawson Boom” in the UK was an interesting first real-time introduction to a credit boom, the author’s first authentic experience of the “madness” that can accompany a credit boom was centred on Japan in 1988 and 1989.

Although it is often overlooked (perhaps because it is yet another rather inconvenient truth), the simple fact is that the COVID-19 Pandemic and the various Supply Chain Disruptions that have followed it has made most of us poorer.