A few weeks ago, we began experimenting with the hypothesis that households – and even some governments – were starting to reassess their long-term income expectations. Years of weak productivity growth, concerns over economic efficiency, the cost of living, the climate and troublesome geopolitics are all likely weighing on confidence in the future, along with the seemingly changed outlook for interest rates.
The US and most other authorities’ reaction to the Global Pandemic was to flood the financial system with cash, principally via the act of central banks buying government bonds. The sums involved were massive, in part because the authorities understandably did not know “just how bad the crisis would be” but also because there was a need in March 2020 to ensure that some financial institutions that were “the wrong side” of the bond market did not perish.
In the days immediately following 9-11, markets understandably fretted that consumer spending would collapse as people would be too scared to go out. In fact, spending picked up – even the author’s usually frugal spending increased.
This may appear an odd question to ask given the recent slew of poor inflation data points that have been released but we suspect that “all is not quite as it seems” within bond markets, or even the global economy. First, the inflation story.
Major “events” in markets have been caused by wrong assumptions over mathematical relationships. The Long Term Capital Management Debacle (LTCMD) in 1998 was primarily the result of the incorrect assumption of perfect markets by a cluster of Nobel Laureates. The naïve and wrong assumptions over correlations proved to be the spectacular undoing of the mortgage markets in 2007-8.
Currently, the US economy is stuttering. Headline growth during the latter half of 2023 was extremely rapid – GDP growth averaged more than twice the economy’s 20-year average - but this strong activity was led by the public sector, either directly through government investment or indirectly via the authorities’ support for household incomes.
The US economy continues to look robust, so we have stayed constructive on growth assets and short maturity global credit where yields are attractive. We still believe that the path to 2% inflation in the US is relatively unclear. If anything, our conviction on this point has increased because easier financial conditions may ultimately pave the way for the return of sticky inflation.
The peaking of interest rates and potentially the US dollar could be a boon for broader markets—particularly those more sensitive to liquidity, countries with more room to ease rates and areas where positive fundamental changes have been overlooked. China’s economy is undergoing a major transition into one that promotes advanced manufacturing, technology, self-sufficiency and higher-end overseas growth. These are areas of our focus.
We expect macro and corporate credit fundamentals across Asia ex-China to stay resilient due to fiscal buffers although slower economic growth seems to loom over the horizon.
This month we discuss why the equity market is relatively unaffected by the political scandal shaking Japan’s ruling party; we also assess how 2024 could become an inflection point in the country’s “savings to investments” drive.
In my experience, there is nothing so powerful for asset markets as an “unquantifiable positive story and a tonne of liquidity”. Russell Napier’s Library of Mistakes in Edinburgh looks brilliantly at some of the madness that has taken hold of financial markets over the centuries (well worth a visit if you are ever nearby), and of course Edward Chancellor’s Devil take the Hindmost is the seminal text on the subject of credit-financed investment madness, but I have seen my fair share of mad booms firsthand.