Andrew Hunt Commentary

There is a growing view that the Pandemic, and the policy response to the Pandemic, have ended the period of Secular Stagnation within the Global Economy and potentially replaced it with “fiscally-led faster growth” and higher inflation. It is easy to see the logic behind this view; the author was an ardent inflationista only 18 months ago. The only flaw in the argument would appear to be the behaviour of the bond markets, which this year look superficially at least to have been embracing the concept of renewed economic stagnation.

The subject of inflation has of course dominated markets in 2022 and most investors – no doubt cheered by some recent improvements in the reported rate of US headline inflation – are hoping that the issue will fade over the course of 2023 and leave them a “clearer run”.

No single catch-phrase epitomises the 2023 global macro outlook, but here are ten predictions for the year ahead.

Rather surprisingly, a UK tabloid newspaper recently contacted the author following the seemingly spectacular “blow up” in the UK bond markets, and the subsequent “crises” within the pension / insurance sectors. The journalist clearly wanted to write a story about reckless spendthrift government fiscal policies, and miss-management by pension fund managers. However, this was not the story that they got from the interview.

We have little (in fact, virtually no) doubt that the opening salvos of the monetary response to the Pandemic were driven by a sense of panic rather than by calculated analysis. The Federal Reserve appeared to be downplaying internally as well as externally the impact of the Pandemic as late as on the 11th March 2020, but by lunch time on the 12th March it was in full crisis mode.

Almost forty years ago, China’s then paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, decided that his country needed a “Great Leap Forward” in order to catch up with its economic rivals and secure its then fading place within the global system.

We have been saying for some time that inflationary pressures within the global goods markets may have peaked (at least for now) and that the global economy is slowing rapidly on the back of what are now very weak real incomes, collapsing monetary growth, and China’s sharp economic downturn (the causes of which run far beyond the country’s zero-COVID strategy).

As it often is when Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party wins an election by an impressive amount, the initial equity market reaction was positive. But the ramifications of the ruling party’s upper house election victory will in the intermediate term be a function of what happens to the global economy and geopolitics in the months and quarters ahead.

Last month’s ever austere Bundesbank Monthly Report contained an essay on Pension Reform in Germany. The article is quite long but suggests that the German Pension system only has two long term options to maintain its solvency: either accept that the purchasing power of pensioners is set to fall; or the retirement age will need to rise to 69 or higher by the year 2070. Either pensioners will have to accept less in the future in real terms or work longer – the choice seems stark.

“Stagflation-lite” coupled with a severe geopolitical crisis was much worse for equities than we expected, but most of the bad news is priced in, so the prospect for global economies and equities in aggregate should improve. While we expect global GDP to moderately underperform consensus, it should skirt recession and positively surprise equity markets, which increasingly have priced in recessionary conditions.