Andrew Hunt Commentary

One hundred and fifty-three quarters have passed since the rather “political” Alan Greenspan was appointed the Chairman of the Federal Reserve. According to our Demand Pressure Index, which seeks to provide a better estimate of the output gap in the economy, the economy has been run “hot” with positive demand pressure (i.e. demand exceeded sustainable supply) in ninety-nine of those post 1986 quarters.

Understandably much of the popular market commentary has centred around the possible “Repatriation Trade” and in particular is has focussed on possible flows out of the UST by foreign investors. There have also been stories of some selling of US equities and private credit instruments, all of which sound quite alarming given the USA’s hefty net Foreign Liabilities Position and reliance on foreign capital to cover its deficits.

The chart below is by no means perfect in terms of its specific execution; global price indices are few and far between but it serves to make the point that, since the advent of “Globalization” during the early – mid 1990s, goods prices have lagged service sector prices by a considerable margin. Persistently positive demand versus output gaps in the West resulted in equally persistent rates of service sector and non-traded inflation, while North Asia’s output & employment maximizing pricing behaviour contained goods prices for structural reasons.

The focus in the media and amongst most analysts has centred around tariffs and a possible fiscal tightening in the USA – although we would argue that on a cash basis the latter is already happening quite aggressively. In some cases, it seems that even where the government has notionally incurred expenses, it does not seem to have distributed funds to its suppliers.

Despite its small size and geographic location, New Zealand has led the World in a number of fields – physics, Postwar economic theory (Bill Phillips was born in NZ), inflation targeting (amongst the first to make this a statutory target), globalization, and of course in many sports.

With their central banks bringing interest rates down from previously restrictive settings, 2024 has been the year when most of the world’s economic players have finally begun to experience an easing of monetary policy. In each instance, these reflected confidence that inflation, or perhaps more accurately inflation expectations, had reached a desired level, or were at least on a path towards it.

Very thoughtfully, my father presented me with a compendium of newspaper front pages covering all 60 of my birthdays. There were two sections, one for a “broadsheet” and one for a “tabloid”. In 1964, the front page of the broadsheet was dominated by an informed discussion about the enacting by a Labour Party Chancellor of a shock 200 b.p. rise in the UK Base Rate in order to stabilize the pound.

France’s Macron became a lame duck President this year. The Tory Party was dumped out of office at the UK general election in favour of a party of relatively inexperienced micro-focussed policymakers who have witnessed a remarkably short electoral honeymoon.

A few weeks ago, we began experimenting with the hypothesis that households – and even some governments – were starting to reassess their long-term income expectations. Years of weak productivity growth, concerns over economic efficiency, the cost of living, the climate and troublesome geopolitics are all likely weighing on confidence in the future, along with the seemingly changed outlook for interest rates.

The US and most other authorities’ reaction to the Global Pandemic was to flood the financial system with cash, principally via the act of central banks buying government bonds. The sums involved were massive, in part because the authorities understandably did not know “just how bad the crisis would be” but also because there was a need in March 2020 to ensure that some financial institutions that were “the wrong side” of the bond market did not perish.

In the days immediately following 9-11, markets understandably fretted that consumer spending would collapse as people would be too scared to go out. In fact, spending picked up – even the author’s usually frugal spending increased.

This may appear an odd question to ask given the recent slew of poor inflation data points that have been released but we suspect that “all is not quite as it seems” within bond markets, or even the global economy. First, the inflation story.

Major “events” in markets have been caused by wrong assumptions over mathematical relationships. The Long Term Capital Management Debacle (LTCMD) in 1998 was primarily the result of the incorrect assumption of perfect markets by a cluster of Nobel Laureates. The naïve and wrong assumptions over correlations proved to be the spectacular undoing of the mortgage markets in 2007-8.

Currently, the US economy is stuttering. Headline growth during the latter half of 2023 was extremely rapid – GDP growth averaged more than twice the economy’s 20-year average - but this strong activity was led by the public sector, either directly through government investment or indirectly via the authorities’ support for household incomes.

In my experience, there is nothing so powerful for asset markets as an “unquantifiable positive story and a tonne of liquidity”. Russell Napier’s Library of Mistakes in Edinburgh looks brilliantly at some of the madness that has taken hold of financial markets over the centuries (well worth a visit if you are ever nearby), and of course Edward Chancellor’s Devil take the Hindmost is the seminal text on the subject of credit-financed investment madness, but I have seen my fair share of mad booms firsthand.

Whether for year-end management reasons, or as a result of political considerations, it is a fact that the US Federal Reserve has allowed effective monetary conditions to ease over the last month. The public sector has injected more than $200 billion of liquidity into the financial system. It therefore comes as no surprise that financial markets are booming, yields are tumbling and the dollar is weak, a situation that we expect to continue into year end.

It has been a wild few weeks within debt markets – sharp sell-offs, even sharper rallies, and then a renewed sell off. Movements in equity markets have looked tame by comparison. Bond markets are certainly having to process a lot of conflicting information – inflation, deflation, politics and a mountain of potential issuance next year following what was an amazingly quiet year for debt issuance in 2023.

Over the recent years, there has been a tendency amongst politicians and the media to target the CPI rather than inflation itself, or at least the inflation process. Too often have we heard from policymakers that inflation can be brought down through direct government subsidies or price controls. Subsidies may well have a justifiable social purpose, particularly during times of externalities such as wars but they have no role in controlling inflation. We have even heard that interest rates should not be increased “because they affect mortgage rates and mortgage costs are in the CPI”.

The media is abuzz with stories about the demise of the US Dollar as a reserve currency and the rise of alternatives, such as the proposed new “BRICs” currency. From our perspective, we cannot think of a worse monetary idea than a pan-BRIC currency. It is difficult to conceive a less optimal currency area i.e. one worse than the Euro Area, which has certainly had (and continues to have) its problems.

There was quite simply nothing not to like about the latest US consumer price index data; not only was the headline a good number but so too were most of the internals.

One cannot turn on a financial news programme at present without hearing some talking-head or other discussing the outlook for interest rates, almost as though they are the only thing that matters to markets or the economy. We suspect that the matter to a degree to the latter, and much less to the former than is generally accepted.

As an undergraduate economist, the subject of foreign exchange reserves and reserve currencies garnered scant attention because we were in a world of floating currencies in which FX intervention, when it did occur, was only ever modest and temporary. It was only in the mid-1980s, when a number of overtly mercantilist economies in Asia began linking their (frequently undervalued) currencies to the USD and acquiring specie that global reserves became a “topic”. During the 1990s, New Zealand operated without reserves.

I think that it was Henry Kissinger that once said that "academic politics is so vicious because the stakes are so low". However, when academic politics affects economic policymaking, the stakes are far from low.

Although recent headline-grabbing events within the banking system have moved the topic of a potential credit crunch centre-stage in the markets’ consciousness, the fact is that a credit crunch within the Global Financial System began a year ago, while that in the US domestic economy began late last year. More recently, Europe looks to have moved down the same path. Admittedly, the global situation did improve during December and early January, when global financial conditions eased for a variety of primarily technical reasons, but this has proved to have been only a false dawn.

Our Gravity Index for China has made only a very modest recovery so far this year.

There is a growing view that the Pandemic, and the policy response to the Pandemic, have ended the period of Secular Stagnation within the Global Economy and potentially replaced it with “fiscally-led faster growth” and higher inflation. It is easy to see the logic behind this view; the author was an ardent inflationista only 18 months ago. The only flaw in the argument would appear to be the behaviour of the bond markets, which this year look superficially at least to have been embracing the concept of renewed economic stagnation.

The subject of inflation has of course dominated markets in 2022 and most investors – no doubt cheered by some recent improvements in the reported rate of US headline inflation – are hoping that the issue will fade over the course of 2023 and leave them a “clearer run”.

No single catch-phrase epitomises the 2023 global macro outlook, but here are ten predictions for the year ahead.

Rather surprisingly, a UK tabloid newspaper recently contacted the author following the seemingly spectacular “blow up” in the UK bond markets, and the subsequent “crises” within the pension / insurance sectors. The journalist clearly wanted to write a story about reckless spendthrift government fiscal policies, and miss-management by pension fund managers. However, this was not the story that they got from the interview.

We have little (in fact, virtually no) doubt that the opening salvos of the monetary response to the Pandemic were driven by a sense of panic rather than by calculated analysis. The Federal Reserve appeared to be downplaying internally as well as externally the impact of the Pandemic as late as on the 11th March 2020, but by lunch time on the 12th March it was in full crisis mode.

Almost forty years ago, China’s then paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, decided that his country needed a “Great Leap Forward” in order to catch up with its economic rivals and secure its then fading place within the global system.

We have been saying for some time that inflationary pressures within the global goods markets may have peaked (at least for now) and that the global economy is slowing rapidly on the back of what are now very weak real incomes, collapsing monetary growth, and China’s sharp economic downturn (the causes of which run far beyond the country’s zero-COVID strategy).

As it often is when Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party wins an election by an impressive amount, the initial equity market reaction was positive. But the ramifications of the ruling party’s upper house election victory will in the intermediate term be a function of what happens to the global economy and geopolitics in the months and quarters ahead.

Last month’s ever austere Bundesbank Monthly Report contained an essay on Pension Reform in Germany. The article is quite long but suggests that the German Pension system only has two long term options to maintain its solvency: either accept that the purchasing power of pensioners is set to fall; or the retirement age will need to rise to 69 or higher by the year 2070. Either pensioners will have to accept less in the future in real terms or work longer – the choice seems stark.

“Stagflation-lite” coupled with a severe geopolitical crisis was much worse for equities than we expected, but most of the bad news is priced in, so the prospect for global economies and equities in aggregate should improve. While we expect global GDP to moderately underperform consensus, it should skirt recession and positively surprise equity markets, which increasingly have priced in recessionary conditions.

Since the Pandemic first unfolded, it has generally paid to invest and act according to what the Federal Reserve Chairman said was going to happen, rather than what did in fact happen. The obvious example being last year, when the Fed told markets not to worry about inflation even though the central bank clearly should have been worried about rising inflation rates…..

The rise that has occurred within longer term bond yields over recent weeks has certainly been “enthusiastic”, and we suspect that many view the move as being no more than a belated / overdue reaction to the higher rates of inflation within the global system.

The GIC expects the global economy to continue struggling in a form of “stagflation-lite” and sees a relatively flat performance for global equities for the next three to six months (although quite positive on Pacific equities), with moderate weakness for global bonds.

The economic costs of the current conflict in Ukraine may pale into insignificance in comparison to the human suffering, but they are not irrelevant to markets. The bottom line is of course that wars make society poorer, as does conflict in general, natural disasters, or catastrophic errors.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there has been considerable media coverage and interest about the implications this has on New Zealand investments. This invasion has seen devasting humanitarian effects. Our thoughts are with the people of Ukraine and those who have had family and friends affected by this crisis.

The Western World today faces a public sector burden that bears a troubling resemblance to the immediate Post-war period in the late 1940s and 1950s; a private sector debt burden that bears comparison to the late 1990s / early 2000s; and an inflation problem that is beginning to look like the 1970s. Now, we would add to this list a “Cold War” situation that looks like the early 1980s (i.e. Afghanistan and other Proxy Wars between superpowers).

The Federal Reserve may have been caught by surprise by the persistence of inflation in the USA over recent months but we suspect that many investors in the Emerging Markets are about to experience a similarly unpleasant surprise of their own.

While last month witnessed only its usual quota of central bank policy meetings, we suspect that it will ultimately go down in history as representing the beginning of what we suspect may become the Great Divergence within central banking. Having spent a generation moving in similar directions in an overt effort to suppress currency volatility, it now appears that the central banks within the major Economic Blocs are beginning to move in different directions. We believe that this development has the potential to dramatically alter the investment universe.

According to our Global Investment Committee, which concentrates on the intermediate term-view regarding developed markets for pension funds and other long-term investors, 2022 looks to be a challenging, but positive year for risk assets. We believe that the G-3 central banks will become more hawkish, and such pivots can often cause potholes and at the very least headwinds, but we trust that policymakers can traverse their new course successfully overall.

The global economy should match the consensus for strong growth, thanks to vaccinations, continued fiscal stimulus, acceptable global geopolitical conditions, and continued low interest rates despite increasingly hawkish central banks. Such, via increased corporate profits, should allow equity markets to perform very well ahead, with impressive returns in each region, particularly in Japan.

Although the late 1980s’ “Lawson Boom” in the UK was an interesting first real-time introduction to a credit boom, the author’s first authentic experience of the “madness” that can accompany a credit boom was centred on Japan in 1988 and 1989.

Although it is often overlooked (perhaps because it is yet another rather inconvenient truth), the simple fact is that the COVID-19 Pandemic and the various Supply Chain Disruptions that have followed it has made most of us poorer.

During the late 1980s, at the height of the Bubble Economy, and at a time during which seemingly everyone wanted to emulate the Japanese economic model, we were lucky enough to have high level access to the Bank of Japan.

Out of the six scenarios presented, a narrow majority of our committee agreed again on a positive scenario in which the global economy matches the market consensus for solid growth, while equities continue to rally.

Out of the six scenarios presented, a solid majority of our committee agreed again on a positive scenario, in which the global economy matches the market consensus for very strong growth, while equities continue to rally.